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Commemorating Robert Regout (1896-1942).  
A chapter from the history of public international law 
revisited
Henri de Waele*
“Ideas need time before they can mature; efforts which seem fruitless, may well 
yield precious assets for mankind in the future. Even on the ruins of destroyed civi-
lizations, new generations have time and time again managed to build themselves a 
safer home. The duty of our days will be clear, even to one looking with anxiety at 
what lies ahead: to work with full dedication, striving to establish an order of truth 
and justice in this world.”1 
1. Introduction
In the Netherlands, it is customary for a new law professor to elaborate on his view 
of his ﬁeld of expertise in his inaugural lecture. The words quoted above are taken 
from the inaugural lecture of professor Robert Regout, and were spoken on February 
28th, 1940. On that day, the new chair of public international law at the University of 
Nijmegen expressed a clear and sympathetic conviction; on the need to stand up for 
what one believes, to remain fully conﬁdent in the fruits of oneʼs endeavours. On that 
day, Regout gave public testimony of his faith in a future for international law, at a 
time when political developments seemed to call for quite a different position. When 
assessing his legacy on the present day, the contemporary reader is still struck by the 
force of the convictions of a scholar determined to live up to the high expectations held 
of him. Brutal, inescapable violence silenced his voice much too soon, thus greatly 
curtailing his heritage. Still he has bequeathed future generations enough, left good 
*  This article contains translated and thoroughly revised parts of my ʻGrond voor vertrouwen. 
Regout als juristʼ, in M.J.F. Lindeijer & A. Welle (eds.), Robert Regout. Maastricht 1896-Dachau 
1942 (Drachten: Omnia Fausta, 2004), pp. 103-123. To date, the only available foreign publica-
tions on Regout have been A. Borret, ʻ Robert H.W. Regout S.J. In memoriamʼ, Grotius, annuaire 
international pour 1940-1946, pp. 9-15; J.J.W. Beuns, ʻVorkämpfer der Völkerverständigung 
und Völkerrechtsgelehrte als Opfer des Nationalismus. Professor Robert Regout S.J.ʼ, Friedens-
Warte 46 (1946), pp. 311-316. 
1  R.H.W. Regout, Is er grond voor vertrouwen in de toekomst van het volkenrecht? [Is there 
reason to believe in a future for international law?] (Nijmegen: Dekker & van de Vegt, 1940), 
p. 12. All translations of Regoutʼs writings are by the present author. 
Department of International and European Law, 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands
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harvest to reap from his efforts. This article seeks to commemorate a life lost, and 
labour, up until now, only scarcely paid attention to.
2. Regout and His Time
Robert Hubert Willem Regout was born in Maastricht in 1896, and belonged to the 
generation of Dutch lawyers that followed in the footsteps of their famous countrymen 
T.M.C. Asser, W.J.M. van Eysinga and C. van Vollenhoven. This was the generation 
of scholars that came into contact with the ﬁrst great peace and disarmament confer-
ences of the early 20th century, and with the ﬁrst global international organisations. 
Regout himself was educated a lawyer around 1926, at a time when the League of 
Nations was going through a hopeful phase of development. The very ﬁrst disputes of 
international law were entrusted to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
at The Hague for a solution, and the discipline of international law was at universities 
cautiously gaining recognition as a specialty. As known, the hope of the day was that 
states and nations would no longer resort to violence, but seek to end their quarrels 
peacefully, preferably through legal means. Public international law was thriving, which 
undoubtedly appealed to many idealistic young lawyers. Maybe, it was held, that after 
the horrors of the ﬁrst World War, unilateral military action could deﬁnitely become a 
thing of the past. After 1919, the period of classic international law with its emphasis 
on absolute state sovereignty had indeed come to an end.2 Yet modern international 
law, in which international relations were to be regulated through binding legal norms, 
was still tender and tentative. Objective rules could still easily be abandoned if the 
political need of the day so required, if practical politics necessitated a less obedient 
attitude. It was 1926 when Regout wrote his ﬁrst article, in which he already hinted 
at the possible future causes of renewed global tensions. “One should not forget that 
the development of international legal relations will always be gradual”, he remarked 
sagely. “Neither individuals nor nations will deserve peace so long as they are unwilling 
to sacriﬁce some of their egoism”.3 What survives to the present day of Regoutʼs ideas 
and endeavours, should then in the ﬁrst place be considered in the light of his time. In 
2  I fully concur with a recent remark by one author that the periodisation of the history of inter-
national law is still far from satisfactory. See R. Lesaffer, ʻ The Grotian tradition revisited: change 
and continuity in the history of international lawʼ, British Yearbook of International Law 2002, 
p. 106. Contrary to him though, I reserve the term ʻmodern  ʼinternational law for the twentieth 
century. ʻ Classic  ʼinternational law in this article refers to the period from the ﬁfteenth-sixteenth 
century up to World War I. Cf. W.G. Grewe, ʻ Die Epochen der modernen Völkerrechtsgeschich-
teʼ, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 103 (1943), pp. 36-66 and 260-294; id., ʻWas 
ist klassisches, was ist modernes Völkerrecht?ʼ, in A. Böhm et al. (eds.), Idee und Realität des 
Rechts in der Entwicklung internationaler Beziehungen. Festgabe für Wolfgang Preiser (Nomos: 
Baden-Baden, 1983). 
3  R.H.W. Regout, ʻEnige opmerkingen over “het recht van de sterkste” bij internationale ver-
houdingen  ʼ[Some remarks concerning the rights of the most powerful in international relations], 
Studiën 106 (1926), p. 433.
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the history of public international law, he belongs to a notable chapter: the pristine and 
kaleidoscopic period of interbellum (1919-1939). The world was in transition, facing 
turbulence, the law itself shifting with it. For those circumstances, Regoutʼs life and 
works might well be of interest to the present. 
3. Character and Education 
When assessing Regoutʼs life and works, one should ﬁrst be well aware of his spiritual 
upbringing, a factor that may complicate fair judgment of the subject under review. 
Robert Regout was trained a Jesuit from the age of 18 onwards, and had completed ex-
tensive religious education before pursuing his legal studies at the University of Leyden 
towards his graduate degree in 1924. This training had an unmistakeable inﬂuence on 
all his personal and professional views. As a consequence, his research as a scholar of 
international law was characterized by a realistic view of manʼs fallibility, coupled with 
solid faith in the veracity of Christendom. Most of his work was not drafted without 
bias, or devoid of value judgments, and to him could probably not have been conceived 
otherwise. His writings continuously had to reﬂect the zealousness with which he pur-
sued his faith, if only to make the message more appealing to his Catholic readers. In 
sum, his perennial quest for peace and justice was in its essence anything but profane. 
Words he often quoted from Scripture in his articles may be testimony to that: “Peace, 
more than anything, is the gift of Christ, which the world itself is unable to offer”.4 
Before any contemporary, secular assessment may then turn out favourably, one should 
understand, and come to terms with his thoroughly christianised legal perspective. As 
his vocation to the Church had preceded his legal aspirations, both, in the end, became 
inextricably intertwined. Acknowledgment of this fact will make his boldest remarks 
more readily understandable, such as his claim that public international law, ﬁnding 
its root in Christianity, could ﬁnd its vitality there only. He held that “unity among 
nations and obedience to a higher authority can only be found in acknowledgment and 
reverence to God. On this essential spiritual foundation the legal construction ought 
to be placed and perfected”.5 
After the completion of his initial religious training, he read law in Leyden from 
1921 to 1924. The inﬂuential scholar with whom he became acquainted there was the 
esteemed chair of international law, professor Willem van Eysinga. Regoutʼs interest 
would from then on be completely captivated by the ﬁeld of expertise of this critically 
acclaimed lawyer, who would sit as a judge at the PCIJ from 1931 onwards.6 In 1924, 
at the age of 28, Regout successfully completed his legal studies, and, stimulated by 
Van Eysinga, started research on his Ph.D. immediately after. Yet, though the Jesuit 
4  R.H.W. Regout, ʻEuropese verhoudingen sinds het verdrag van Versailles. Frankrijks strijd 
om veiligheid  ʼ[European relations since the Treaty of Versailles. Franceʼs quest for security], 
Studiën 116 (1931), p. 65.
5  O.c., supra n. 1, p. 14.
6  A further biography can be found in Sparsa collecta. Een aantal der verspreide geschriften 
van jonkheer mr. W.J.M. van Eysinga (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1958), pp. 528-545. 
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order had noticed his intellectual wit and prowess, he would be assigned to other than 
academic tasks for the next ﬁfteen years. Nonetheless, he continued work on his doc-
toral dissertation in private, besides his religious pursuits, and would meanwhile not 
remain idle as a publicist either. 
4. Publicist and Activist 
Regout swiftly emerged as a public ﬁgure in The Netherlands during the 1920s and 
1930s, in particular as a champion of the peaceful resolution of international conﬂicts. 
Being a priest, trained as a lawyer, he eschewed excessively idealistic peace-propaganda 
that would not pay regard to legal considerations.7 Nevertheless, he had no desire or 
intention either to present himself exclusively as a lawyer or a legal theorist. A glance 
at the range of subjects he covered in his articles will reveal this easily, perhaps even 
more so when one takes the topics of the numerous lectures, speeches and radio-com-
ments he delivered from 1929 onwards into regard. For the most part, his interest 
went out to public international law in a broad sense. Thus, in his works, the legal 
perspective was often widened so as to encompass considerations on the character, 
politics and especially the history of various nations and peoples. Above all, he enjoyed 
discussing contemporary developments, and did not shun expounding his views in the 
general press. Writing over forty essays and (shorter) articles, Regout proved himself 
a very lively and entertaining author. He disliked excessively technical discourse, but 
wrote in rich and vibrant prose, often employing touching analogies. Sadly, his truly 
scholarly output remained rather limited, as barely twenty treatises that can lay claim 
to this qualiﬁcation may be credited to his name.8 Partially, this can be ascribed to him 
deploying activities on much too broad a front. For he exerted himself to combine 
his tasks as a priest in the spiritual care for the ﬂock, with his role as commentator on 
contemporary legal and political developments for his colleagues and the public-at-
large. He was also a celebrated and much sought-after guest-speaker, and ﬁery in his 
activities for the Rooms-Katholieke Vredesbond (Roman Catholic Peace League) and 
as a legal advisor to the Rooms-Katholieke Staatspartij (Roman Catholic State Party) 
as well. More than anything else though, it was his early demise that prevented his 
scientiﬁc legacy from expanding further.9 His star would thus never rise much beyond 
his Dutch soil. As far as foreign publications go, his name lives on through his ﬁrst 
major publication only: the commended dissertation on the doctrine of just war, which 
he ﬁnished by the end of 1933. 
7  See e.g. R.H.W. Regout, ʻVrede en Volkenrecht  ʼ[Peace and international law], Pro Pace 10 
(1938), p. 57.
8  Including his Ph.D. thesis and published inaugural lecture. An extensive overview may be 
obtained from <http://www.robertregout.nl/publicaties.htm>. 
9  Upon his acceptance of the Nijmegen professorship in 1940, the latter seemed a manifest 
destiny. Cf. Borret (supra), p. 9: “Mort à lʼâge de 46 ans après à peine trois années de professorat, 
il nʼétait quʼau commencement de sa carrière scientiﬁque”. 
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5. Regout and Bellum Justum 
Regout would obtain his doctorate under the supervision of the renown Ben Telders,10 
who had succeeded Van Eysinga at Leyden in 1931. The thesis was entitled La doctrine 
de la guerre juste de Saint Augustin à nos jours dʼaprès les théologiens et les canonistes 
catholiques, and was published in Paris with a preface by Yves de la Brière, chair of 
international law at the Institut Catholique in Paris.11 Regoutʼs main incentive for un-
dertaking the study was the desire to make his contemporaries more familiar with the 
doctrine of bellum justum.12 In his research, Regout carried out a critical investigation 
of the views of early, medieval and modern Catholic writers on the theory of just war, 
starting from St. Augustine, and moving on to the 20th century through (among others) 
Aquinas, Vitoria and Suarez. As his leitmotiv, he resolved to examine the continuity 
of the Catholic doctrine of just war from the days of St. Augustine to the present. In 
this, he sought to rebut the assertion of Alfred Vanderpol that war, according to the 
medieval doctrine, could only be regarded just if undertaken to punish wrongdoing.13 
According to Regout, Catholic doctrine had always recognized as just, war to prevent 
or remedy injustice if no other method is available, and if the hardship of war is not 
disproportionate to the injustice, even though the state causing the injustice was acting 
under ʻ invincible ignoranceʼ, and so was not guilty of a ʻ fault  ʼdeserving punishment. He 
however exculpated Vanderpol to some extent, by pointing out that under the Catholic 
doctrine ʻoffensive warʼ, or war in the full sense, is permissible only for punishment. 
War to defend or to restore rights must be limited to the acts necessary to accomplish 
those results. Moreover, he admitted that medieval writers used the word ʻvindicate  ʼ
in a loose sense, covering both reparation and punishment, and often did not visual-
ize the possibility of objective without subjective wrong, that is, of injustice without 
culpability. His most striking premise then, was that the Catholic doctrine of just war 
could provide the directing principles for the juridical organization of society in his 
time. To Regout, war remained a viable way of restoring justice, to be justly undertaken 
when all other means of repairing or preventing injustice were exhausted. However, 
he recognized the ethical character of the doctrine, and did not shrink from admitting 
that it could not serve as the alpha and omega on the lawfulness of waging war. For all 
10  Interestingly, the lives of Telders and Regout display a remarkable parallel to the casual eye. 
Both had a ﬁrm interest in the philosophical aspects of international law, both published essays on 
Dutch neutrality in the 1930s, and on the applicable legal regime during the occupation. Finally, 
both passed away long before their time, held in German captivity due to their scholarly work: 
Regout in Dachau, 1942; Telders in Bergen-Belsen, 1945. 
11  R.H.W. Regout, La doctrine de la guerre juste de Saint Augustin à nos jours dʼaprès les théo-
logiens et les canonistes catholiques [avec une préface du R.P.Y. de la Brière] (Paris: Pédone, 
1934).
12  Ibid., p. 17: “Si nous avons entrepris cette étude, cʼest en grande partie parce que nous étions 
persuadé quʼil y a tout avantage pour notre époque et pour lʼavenir à se familiariser avec la vieille 
doctrine de la guerre juste. ” 
13  See A. Vanderpol, La doctrine scolastique du droit de guerre (Paris: Pédone, 1925).
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the inspiration it could offer, a regime of positive law would be equally indispensable 
for bringing about lasting stability and security in the international community. But 
contrary to those of the opinion that the doctrine belonged to a different time-period, 
and should by now be completely abandoned, Regout was insistent that the underlying 
principles kept their value in full, as long as in their application due regard is paid to 
the exigencies of the modern era.14
When browsing through the book, one is impressed with Regoutʼs comprehensive 
and painstaking treatise on the history of the doctrine of bellum justum. The author 
gleaned the writings bearing on the subject from early Christian and medieval authors 
with great erudition, and displays great determination in explaining the meaning of 
those passages from the context and the general drift of their thoughts. The underlying 
principles, the more controversial points, the evolution of the doctrine and the separate 
stages of its development are exposed with ﬁrm dedication. The detailed disquisition, 
with its emendation of inaccuracies promoted by earlier writers, unmistakably provides 
a highly invaluable contribution to the history of international law. Having paid this 
tribute, and with continual regard to the lasting merits of the book, it must be admitted 
though that the ﬁnal contention of the book must have been somewhat ﬂawed already 
at the time of its publication. For the almost scholastic attitude the author applied in 
his research, led him in the end to minimizing the difference between the medieval 
and the modern theory of just war. As known, the central idea to the medieval theory, 
as far as it had a central idea, was that war formed a means to justice. The question 
of who began the war was unimportant. Thus the distinction between defensive and 
offensive war was morally neutral: a defensive war could be unjust, and an offensive 
war might be just. In all, justice was a value greater than peace. In the conclusion to 
his study, Regout erroneously tried to ﬁnd this same principle in the positive law of 
the 1930s. Thus he wrote: “A war legitimately begun in virtue of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations against a state refusing to submit to a juridical sentence ought to be 
called offensive, and resistance to this war ought to be called defensive, although in 
such a case it is a just war of police and an unjust war of resistance”.15 Here, his desire 
to revive an antiquated theory seems to have eclipsed an accurate assessment of the 
law then in force. For the Covenant of the League did of course not give authority to 
states individually to make war against a state, merely because it refused to submit 
to a juridical sentence. The sanctions were applicable only against a state which had 
resorted to war in violation of the Covenant. The only just war thereunder (at least 
from the moment the period of paciﬁc procedure had expired) was against a state which 
14  Ibid., p. 305: “Cette doctrine du Moyen Age et du XVIe siècle nʼest ni vieillie ni en train de 
vieillir; elle reste entièrement utilisable de nos jours, mais, pour lʼappliquer, il conviendra de 
tenir compte de la modiﬁcation des réalités.” 
15  O.c. (supra, n. 11), p. 309-310: “[U]ne guerre légitime engagée en vertu du Pacte de la Société 
des Nations contre un Etat refusant de se soumettre à une sentence juridique devrait ainsi être 
qualiﬁée dʼoffensive, et la résistance à cette guerre être dite défensive, bien quʼen un tel cas il 
sʼagisse dʼune (juste) guerre de police ou dʼune (injuste) guerre de résistance.”
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had resorted to war.16 Thus, the only just war was a war of individual or collective 
defence against a state which had initiated war.17 This change from a system which 
contemplated war as an instrument of justice to a system which outlaws war except as 
defence against a state which has begun war, was a radical abandonment rather than 
merely a new application of the medieval doctrine. Historically, this new idea grew, 
not from the medieval doctrine but from a system of international law that aimed to 
limit the destructiveness of military activity and preventing war from spreading, not at 
determining the just side in a war.18 From this point of view, the paucity of discussion 
as regards the actual application of the doctrine to events in Regoutʼs own time, seems 
quite regrettable. In the tenacious adherence to his contention, any assessment of the 
actual value of the theory by its practical applicability was lacking. “To determine the 
legality of a defensive war one can demand the traditional conditions: that the attack 
is unjust, that war is the only means of stopping the injustice, and that the war and the 
wrongs causing it are proportionate,” he wrote.19 But such criteria obviously were in 
need of further development or elaboration before they could regain any contemporary 
signiﬁcance. Regout however did not set himself the task of ﬁlling these voids, of 
presenting meticulous legal criteria for the beneﬁt of modern usage. The book remains 
admirable on this very day for the thorough exposition of the ideas of Catholic writers 
through the ages on a fundamental subject of international relations. But the authorʼs 
16  To this end Article 12 of the Charter of the League of Nations read: “The Members of the 
League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they 
will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, 
and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or 
the judicial decision, or the report by the Council (…).” Article 16 added: “Should any Member 
of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall 
ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League 
(…). It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments 
concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally 
contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League (…).”
17  Though it may be recalled that the Pact of Paris (Kellog-Briand), in force from 1929 up to 
the present day, in its ﬁrst article condemned recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies, and renounced it in whatever form or type as an instrument of national policy in 
relations between the contracting states. 
18  The idea of World War I thus forming a fundamental watershed in the history of international 
law, is shared by many authors. See inter alia A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 30-31; P. Malanczuk, Akehurst sʼ Modern Introduction to Interna-
tional Law (London: Routledge 1997), pp. 23-32; Ch. de Visscher, Théories et réalités en droit 
international (Paris: Pédone, 1953), pp. 69 and 74-80; A. Verdross, Völkerrecht (Berlin: Duncker 
& Humblot, 1937), p. 11-20. 
19  O.c. (supra, n. 11), p. 310: “Pour determiner la licéité dʼune guerre defensive on peut exiger 
les conditions traditionelles: que lʼattaque soit injuste, que la guerre soit lʼultime moyen de 
détourner lʼinjustice (ce qui sera naturellement le cas la plupart du temps) et que la guerre et le 
tort causé soient proportionnés (…).” (italics in original)
88 Journal of the History of International Law
epilogue, pleading for a renaissance of the Catholic doctrine, was overdue already at 
the time of writing.20 Thus, his opus magnum was to be of beneﬁt mostly to historians, 
theologians and canonists. To practising lawyers, let alone to the future drafters of a 
United Nations Charter, he had little to offer. Nevertheless, by obtaining his doctorate, 
his academic career was secured.
6. Later Work
Most sympathy for Regout and his work may well arise from inspection of his later 
writings. The young doctor ﬁrst devoted some ink to the Italian-Abessinian conﬂict of 
1935-1936. He ﬁnally attempted a practical application of the Catholic doctrine of just 
war, and in doing so observed that the refusal to offer any concessions to Italy theoreti-
cally amounted to an injustice on the part of Abessinia.21 He hesitated to draw further 
conclusions from this inference, and ended on a vacillating note. Writing for the Catholic 
Encyclopaedia in 1937 on the entry ʻwarʼ, he in fact admitted that the old doctrine 
had had its day, and could only serve as a makeshift solution in absence of a binding 
set of international legal norms.22 It might be argued in his favour that the inability of 
the League of Nations to take effective action in the 1930s, created a legal vacuum in 
which the doctrine of bellum justum, for practical purposes, could serve equally well 
as one of non-intervention. For in those days, as one will recall, half-heartedness, lack 
of determination, overt sabotage and a faulty design prevented the collective security 
system from functioning properly. Accordingly, by the mid-1930s, the authority of the 
League of Nations had almost completely evaporated. Despite earlier intentions, most 
states seemed unwilling to sacriﬁce their egoism. Regout then kept close track in his 
publications of the international tensions that were ripping the world apart. Characteristic 
of the authorʼs later work may well be his remarkable, enduring optimism: 
“Current affairs look grim indeed. But are there traces of light, that leave hope for 
a change for the better? My response is afﬁrmative. (…) One may often hear the 
remark, in regard of the veritable impotency of the League of Nations, that the 
experiment of the League now belongs to the past. This assertion may prove to be 
20  Regoutʼs advocacy for a revival of St. Augustineʼs doctrine forms an excellent example of the 
neo-scholastic surge dominating the works of Catholic scholars in the early twentieth century. 
This development was stimulated by Pope Leo XIII and found its root in the encyclical Aeterni 
Patris (1879). Among the other books published in those days on bellum justum in the Catholic 
tradition were Vanderpolʼs (supra, n. 13), and L.J.C. Beaufortʼs La guerre comme instrument de 
secours ou de punition (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1933). The Franciscan friar Beaufort would succeed 
Regout on the Nijmegen chair in 1948. 
21  R.H.W. Regout, ʻHet vraagstuk van den rechtvaardigen en onrechtvaardigen oorlog en het 
Italiaans- Abessynisch conﬂict  ʼ[The question of just and unjust war and the Italian-Abessinian 
conﬂict], Studiën 124 (1935) p. 362. 
22  Katholieke Encyclopedie (Amsterdam: Vondel, 1937), lemma ʻoorlogʼ.
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correct. Yet it is equally possible that the smouldering ﬁre will once again be fanned 
to great heights.”23  
At the request of the Roman Catholic State Party, Regout had in 1936 already drafted 
a razor-sharp analysis of the Leagueʼs deﬁciencies. He ascribed the main weaknesses 
to the lack of universal membership, and the below par moral effect of its existence on 
the mentality of its members. 
“But the principles of legal organisation underlying the League are completely right 
and valuable. The institution in its present form, despite its imperfections, is an 
attempt in the right direction. It is able to set the minds straight, to a posture more 
amenable to the rule of law (…). If the League of Nations were to be dissolved, 
without any other organ put in its place, one of the ﬁnal opportunities at our disposal 
to renounce the traditional happenchance rules of nationalistic power play, would 
be abandoned.”24 
By the end of 1938 still, he agreed that much could be said to the detriment of the 
League, and one could point to many lacunae – “but an undisputable fact is, that with 
its creation, we have embarked upon the road towards the Promised Land”.25 In January 
1940, he vigorously addressed Catholic and Protestant youth in a lecture entitled ʻThe 
peace aheadʼ. By that time, despite lofty earlier resolutions, the scourge of war had 
been unleashed once again. Where lay the blame for this? “Not so much in the legal ar-
rangements, as in the mentality; not so much in the construction, but in its underground 
(…) a lack of commitment to the unity of mankind.” The follow-up was a spur to seize 
actual and potential possibilities for improvement: “We can make a difference. Away 
with defeatism. Just as the institution of the League of Nations will collapse without 
sincere dedication, thus our attempts will be in vain without an inner vitality”.26 
7. Professorship, Occupation and Demise
When those words were spoken, Regout had already been appointed professor by the 
Nijmegen law faculty. By February 1940, at the age of 43, he would ofﬁcially assume 
his position with the celebrated inaugural lecture entitled ʻIs there reason to believe in 
a future for international law?ʼ. He admitted that in common usage, international law 
23  R.H.W. Regout, ʻ Heeft het recht in de wereld afgedaan?  ʼ[Has the world abandoned the law?], 
Pro Pace 10 (1938), p. 186.
24  R.H.W. Regout, De internationale plaats en taak van onze nationale gemeenschap. Nederland 
en de Volkenbond [The international position and task of our national community. The Netherlands 
and the League of Nations] (The Hague: Rooms Katholieke Staatspartij, 1936), p. 10.
25  O.c. (supra, n. 7), p. 58.
26  Transcript of a lecture held at a symposium organised by Catholic and Protestant youth in 
Amsterdam, 18 January 1940 (Nijmegen, Archive of the Catholic Documentation Centre (KDC), 
Z.160.1.36), p. 3. (italics in original)
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had become a subject for scorn and mockery. He saw enough reasons for modesty. After 
all, people had expected international law to bring about a realm of peace and justice; 
this it had failed to deliver. But on the question of whether one could ﬁnd reasons to 
believe in a future for international law, he answered afﬁrmatively and with conviction. 
“Not just lawyers, also politicians and diplomats have experienced turbulent years full 
of hope and disappointment. But why should we suppose people will not learn from 
experience?”. Looking back on previous centuries, an international opinio juris had, 
according to Regout, taken root. A sense of right and wrong was slowly emerging on 
a global scale. Positive law should now be founded on a sincere desire for coopera-
tion. But:
“One should not be impatient. A mentality of centuries is impossible to alter within 
twenty years; the history of nations should not be measured with the short yardstick 
of a human life. The decline in our days may be a short phase, in a longer process of 
ascension to a higher ground. (…) Public international law is still in its infancy. May 
many of the students here attending endeavour with passion to one day construct a 
legal order among nations as a manifestation of the divine Justice in this world.”27
On the 10th of May, the Nazis abruptly invaded The Netherlands. After ﬁve days, the 
guns silenced, and the Dutch government had capitulated. Regout was both appalled 
and resolved. At the start of the occupation, he immediately begun travelling around 
the country, contacting colleagues, journalists, local politicians and academia. He 
encouraged them to stand up for themselves, advised against collaboration, and urged 
the faint-hearted not to succumb to threats. To enlighten the spirits on a larger scale, 
by the end of May, he would publish a ﬁnal and most audacious article. It was entitled 
ʻThe legal regime in occupied territoryʼ, and consisted of a succinct yet well-founded 
analysis of the fourth section of the 1907 Hague Convention on the laws and customs 
of war on land. In his assessment, the author emphasises that The Netherlands experi-
enced a state of occupation, not of annexation, which entailed that Dutch law remained 
in force as usual.
“Our national and religious convictions remain unblemished. We are Dutchmen 
on Dutch soil, and many times already it has become clear to us how the German 
soldiers sojourning in our country, for whom the love of their country is rooted so 
deep within their hearts, respect us for being who we are, for remaining dedicated 
to our own Queen and Fatherland with heart and soul.”28  
From a legal perspective, nothing in the article could be considered truly disputable. 
Regout correctly asserted that the occupied territory remained subjected to the ousted 
Sovereign, even though the Nazi authorities de jure exercised the actual power. But 
the subject Regout tread on was in itself too daring, the tone too risky: 
27  O.c. (supra, n. 1), respectively pp. 4, 8 and 17-18.
28  R.H.W. Regout, ʻDe rechtstoestand in bezet gebied  ʼ[The legal regime in occupied territory], 
Studiën 133 (1940), p. 471. 
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“We should strictly abide by our commitments towards the occupying force. (…) 
All resistance would be futile and injurious. When acting thus, we are not acting in 
betrayal or disloyalty to our Sovereign. We have full conﬁdence in her return, and 
expect a swift restoration of liberty to our country. Yet, for as long as the temporal 
situation of occupation lasts, and no peace is made between the Dutch and the Ger-
man government, the interest of the fatherland does request us to abide by the rules 
of the occupying force.”29 
It is worthy noting that the study by Regout was published long before any true re-
sistance was taking root and form in The Netherlands. It was an early sign of protest, 
delivered quite some time before the Leyden professor Cleveringa would stage his 
famous public address in deﬁance of the dismissal of his Jewish colleague Meyers. The 
latter, which took place on 26 November 1940, is commonly regarded the ﬁrst ofﬁcial 
protest against the Nazis in Dutch academia. Regout knew very well that he could 
be arrested for what he did, but wilfully took the risk. As little there was to criticize 
his remarks from a legal perspective, the political stance in his article, at least to the 
Naziʼs, was unacceptable.
On the 29th of June, in his absence, the Gestapo raided his home. The mistaken 
suspicion was that Regout stood in close contact with the German Jesuit Friedrich 
Muckermann, the driving force behind the underground Catholic opposition against the 
Nazis in Germany. Finding his room sealed, Regout voluntarily reported to the Gestapo 
on the 3rd of July, and was subsequently detained in Arnhem. Even when it entailed 
being locked up, Regout remained determined to stand up for what he believed in. His 
article on the legal regime in occupied territory, in which he admonished the Nazis to 
adhere closely to positive rules of international law, would seal his abysmal fate. The 
head of the German Sicherheitsdienst in The Netherlands, W. Harster, had made an 
in-depth study of the article. He ordered the ʻpublic enemy  ʼRegout to be transported 
to Berlin.30 After having spent almost a year in captivity, he was sent to the Dachau 
concentration camp in 1941. Suffering cruel and degrading treatment there, Robert 
Regout, a martyr for international law, passed away on December 28, 1942.  
8. Regout’s Legacy
“If a humane society of peoples is only possible when the rule of law, and not the 
random exercise of violence, controls this society, then all effort should be directed 
towards establishing that rule of law. Even when noticing that one is continuously 
29  Ibid., p. 473.
30  In a letter of 21 August 1940 by Harster to F. Wimmer, Generalkommisar für Verwaltung und 
Justiz, he quoted the lines from Regoutʼs article which could be considered anti-German. This 
convinced the latter to order Regout to remain in captivity: “Er hat in der Öffentlichkeit Äuszerun-
gen gebraucht, die den Nationalsozialismus und seine Staatsform in schärfster Weise angriffen”. 
(Leyden, Archive of the Dutch Institute for War Documentation (NIOD), 8g, 072732/9). 
92 Journal of the History of International Law
pushed farther away from that objective, one must then, if necessary, even be pre-
pared to row against the stream.”31 
What Regout has bequeathed to the present, should primarily be assessed in the light 
of his time. He saw reason to believe in international law, was himself a personiﬁca-
tion of that belief. In an uphill struggle, he stood up for justice and civilization. His 
message was that to expel war from the world, one should acknowledge the necessity 
of respecting international agreements. He wrote a commended, voluminous thesis 
on the history of the doctrine of just war. In his writings, lectures and teachings, he 
propagated a sincere desire for cooperation, essential for a lasting peace. His faith in 
the ﬁnal triumph of justice remained up until the very end. His voice may have been 
silenced in a short triumph of lawlessness, his faith would be redeemed, his struggle 
proven not to have been in vain. On the eve of the Second World War, Regout saw a 
possibility, even a probability, that a more effective legal regime would be established 
between nations. Mankind, he expected, would put the lessons of history to good use. 
However, he knew this future development could only be gradual. The next generations 
would reap the fruits of the tree, which still had to take root in his time. 
Present-day lawyers will agree that international law has made great progress, even 
though the horrors of a Second World War had to lend force to this development. That 
the United Nations in its 1945 Charter outlawed the unilateral use of force, could not 
guarantee that the possibility for, or the magnitude of the suffering would become any 
less. But the growing desire for cooperation established a mutual interdependence 
worldwide, which rules out a relapse into the disorder and lawlessness of previous 
centuries. Even today, there is every reason for modesty. Regout himself wrote already 
in 1926, that even in the most perfected society of nations, violations of the peace would 
occur. But the assessment that the law has been broken, proves that a legal order exists. 
“The system of international law will survive, as it has done before, both terrorism 
and breaches of international law by powerful states,” writes Brownlie.32 We still face 
problems of legitimacy, but on legality global consensus is slowly emerging. Or as 
Regout hopefully predicted: “On one day, crimes and sad incidents will remain mere 
exceptions, generally experienced as transgressions against the rule of law”.33 
Regout perhaps was not a true scholar of international law in the modern sense. He 
lived in a time when modern international law was still in its infancy. But his lasting, 
great achievement has been that he made the general public in The Netherlands more 
receptive to the international rule of law, through his knowledge and conviction. With 
his learned mind, and through his zealous aspirations, he let a light shine where dark-
ness beckoned. The ideas he fostered have matured; the present generation can enjoy 
the assets his efforts have yielded. 
31  O.c. (supra, n. 1), p. 10.
32  I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
preface.
33  O.c. (supra, n. 3), p. 433.
